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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
.H~RffY

li ;.~ \\'if«,

NINE and DORA T. SIN1£,
Pla.intiff s-Appellants,

vs.
\\- l~~TEHl'\ TRA 'n!JL, INC., a
<'oq)()ration, HYATT CHALET
}Hrn:LS, INC., a corporation, and
liABO\,D BUTLER ENTERPRISES
~:o. 11:5, INC., a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
10633

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Sri\'\ TEl\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Tlw Appellants brought suit to restrain the various

Hespondents from continuing with the construction of a
restaurant building on a piece of property 40 feet by
!JI fed located on North Temple in Salt Lake City.
Then· \\·a:-:; a hearing· on an order to show cause before the
HonorahlP l\farcellus K. Snow, who, after counsel had
<'nten'd into stipulations, dissolved the temporary restraining order which had been placed on the property
in<'ich·nt to the order to slww cause (R 35 ).
rl1lw case was tried on its merits before the Honorable
~tPwnrt ~r.

Hanson, sitting without a jury, who signed
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judgment on Hw 25th day of 1\1 arch, 196ti, dismissing the
action on the merits (R. G4).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts stated in Appellanh;' brief are generally
correct. An understanding of the facts, however, requin'R
the following further statement:
This action involves a parcel of land situate in Salt
Lake ,City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, mon• particularly bounded and described as follows:
Commencing 141.5 feet west of the southeast
corner of Lot 1, Block 97, Plat "A", Salt Lake
City survey and running thence west 40 feet;
thence north 97 feet; thence east 40 feet; thence
south 97 feet to the point of beginning, togethPr
with a right of way over land to the east tlwreof.
At the time of trial, the above described parcel of land
"·as owned in fee by Respondent vVestern Travel, Inc.,
herein termed "\Vestern." Respondent Western, prior
to the filing of Appellants' complaint, had leased said
premises to the Respondent Harold Butler Enterprises
No. 115, Inc., herein termed "Butler.'' (R. 59)
Prior to 19'58 Appellants were purchasing the above
described parcel of land under a contract and prior to
1960 had transferred their ownership in said parcel to
the predecessor in interest of Wes tern. In connection
with such transfer Appellants executed and delivered a
quitclaim deed wherein a restrictive covenant was imposed upon said premises in language as follows :
"This property shall not be used for the erection of a motel thereon." (R. 59)
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lu l\larch, 1965, Respondent Butler acting in accordm1ce with the provisions of its lease obtained a building
permit for the construction of a restaurant upon the
allow dt-scribed property and immediately thereafter
('Olllllll'nred the construction of a restaurant building
upon said premises. Notwithstanding the fact that Ap1wllants kne\\· of the commencement and prosecution of
~a id n•staurant construction no notice of any intention
to pren•nt such construction was served upon or given
to H(•spondents until on or about the 15th day of July,
l %S. At the time of the service of such notice the extPrior portions of the structure of said building had been
<·ompldPd with the exception of a small portion of the
rnof. 'rlw appliances were in the building but not in place,
and tlwn• had been expended or incurred, including appliant<'s for the restaurant, the sum of approximately
$:200,000.00, representing approximately three-fourths of
thP total cost of the restaurant. (R. 60)
H(•spondent \Vestern at the time of trial owned a
pan·el of land adjoining the above-described premises.
This adjoining parcel has been leased by Western to
llespondt'nt Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc., herein tenned
"Hyatt." On the adjoining parcel Hyatt has constructed
and at tlw time of trial was operating a motel. There
is no physical connection between the restaurant structun• and the motel structure on the adjoining premises.
ThP 01wration of the restaurant by Butler is separate
and independent from the operation of the motel by
l 1~·att. The leases by \VestE>rn to Hyatt and Butler are
"'parak and independt'nt transactioni3, and the busillf'Ss<·s of Hyatt and Butler are distinct enterprises con-
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ducted separately by these two Re8pondents and then•
has been no concerted action or conspiracy between theli!
rn connecbon with such operations. (R. 60)
\iVhile the motel and restaurant were constructed by
the same general contractor, the structures were erected
under separate contracts, each independent of the other
and the structures were designed by separate independent
architects. (R. 60-61)
The restaurant has a seating capacity for 160 patrons and the motel has a capacity for 100 units. 'l1he
restaurant was completed and opened for operations in
the early fall of 1965, and has been in continuous overation up to the time of trial. At the time of trial, approximately 90% of the persons patronizing the restaurant
came from the general public, independent of guests of
the motel. \iVhen the motel is fully occupied it is estimated
by the restaurant operator that not more than 20% of
the restaurant patronage will come from guests at the
motel, and that the remaining restaurant patronage will
come from the general public. (R. 61)
The premises above described upon which the covenant above set forth is imposed are completely occupied
by the restaurant structure and no part of the motel is
located thereon. The restaurant constructed and operated
by the Respondent Butler upon the premises hereinabove
described is not a part of the motel constructed and
operated by Respondent Hyatt upon adjoining premises.
(R. 61) The only question is whether or not this restaurant building and the use thereof violates the restrictive
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<·o\ <·nant

on.
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which prohiLits "the erection of a motel there-

Appellants, of course, could not show that a restaunrnt is a motel; therefore their evidence was geared
to tlw proposition that inasmuch as the restaurant was
constrnded in conjunction with the construction of the
adjacent Hyatt Chalet l\Iotel, that it was a part of the
~lotPl Cornrilex and therefore, by association, a motel.
'l'lH· trial court, over the continued objection of counsel
for ali of the Hespondents permitted the Appellants to
intrnduel' hearsay evidence from magazines, tourist court
,ion rnals, telephone books, etc., describing motels, hotels,
t'('stamants, and complexes of various kinds. It also permitted ''expert" witnesses to describe the nature of the
rnotd business. rrhe best characterization and summation of this "evidence" was in the testimony of l\fr. Leon
Dalt> Rt·<,d who is District Governor for Best vVestern
).I okhi in \Yashington and the Province of British Col umhia. He testified that under the "motel umbrella"
;m• many businesses which increase in number as motels
dPn·lop throughout the country. His conclusion was that
it wonld he difficult to conceive of any business that
m;g-ht not be under this "motel umbrella." An example
given was Covey's Little America, which is actually
"a little citv" under the ''motel umbrella" (R. 167).
Hespondent Butler's evidence consisted primarily of
b·stirnon:' given by Richard G. Sharp and Donald Daniel.
~rr. Sharp testified that he is an architect and supervised
tli<• eonstruction of the restaurant building which was
dPsig-n<'d by architects who had nothing to do with designing of the Chalet Motel. The restaurant plans were
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m ac·cordanct-- ,,·ith other n·stauranb design for th.
DPnn:- ehain, \d1ieh chain is Pntirely indPpendPnt nf tlJ ..
!f yatt Chalet. (R. :23S-:2-!3)
.Jir. Daniel testified that he had managed tht> re:'
taurant in q_uestion sincP its opening on October ~9,
1965. The restaurant has a seating capacity for 160 people.
The majority of its business comes from the general
public - not from the motel guests. (R. :2-!5) He estimated that in tlw tourist season about SOS( of tht' re:-taurant's business comes from the general public, and
in the "-inter months about 90% to 95%. (R. :2-!.5-G)
Other e\idence \\-hich the Court had came from hi~
\isit to the premises in company with all counsel representing the parties.
After considering all of the evidence the Court
granted Respondents' motion to dismiss.
ARGl'~IEXT

POIXT I.
THE RESTRICTIYE COYEXA...'\T ·wHICH
PROYIDES: '"THIS PROPERTY SH ALL
XOT BE rsED FOR THE ERECTIOX OF A
~I OT EL THERE OX'' DOES XOT APPLY TO
THE ERBCTIOX OF A RESTAl-RAXT.
It would seem to counsel that the very statement of
Point I answers itself. Appellants, however, argue otherwise, and by a liberal use of the word •·motel" apply it
as an "umbrella" which co\ers other businesses, including Butler's restaurant. Such an interpretation is exceedingly liberal, to say the least, and contrary to the strict

-

'

inl1· ot' (_·011:-;trnction applil·d by the courts to restrictive
1·1JY1·nanb.
(a)

lfrstrictil'c crnenants are strictly construed.

Tlie C'onrts have almost nnivenmlly stated the rule
tltat the:· do not favor restrictions upon the utilization
, ,f land, and that such covenants are strictly construed
ill favor of the free and unrestricted use of the property.

In Oard11er c. Jlaffitt, 7-! S.\V. 2d 60-! (Mo., 193-!),
tliPn· \ms an appeal from a judgment of the lower court
in favor of the plaintiff in a proceeding to remove the
cloud of a building line restriction. The Court stated:
"The intention of the parties is the paramount
and controlling question. That intention is to be
a:-;eertained from the terms of the deed considered
in tlw light of the circumstances surrounding the
partit's. Restrictions, being in derogation of the
foe conveyed, "-ill not be extended hy implication
to include anything not clearly expressed. • • *
Doubts arising as to the intention of the parties
mu::-;t be resolved in favor of the free and untnu1111w led nse of tlw land." Id., 7-! S.\Y. 2d at 607.
In 81;orn I'. Occrlzolt, 262 P. 2d 828 (Kan., 1953)
then• \\·a:-; involved an action to construe a restrictive
eonnant in each of two warranty deeds against the erection of an:· dwelling costing less than $3,000.00 and containing- lt>ss than four rooms. The plaintiffs had erected
an apartment on the parcel of land in question. The
('nmt in holding that the covenant did not prohibit the
n1•dion of the apartment, stated:
"The rules governing the construction of
(•nvenants imposing restrictions on tht' nse of
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realty are the same as those applicable to anv
contract or covenant, including the rule that
where there is no ambiguity in the language usvd'
there. is no room for construction, and the plai 1~
meanmg of the language governs." Id., :2(i2 P. ~fl
at 830.
The Supreme Court of Kansas further stated in the
Sporn case, supra, its rule of strict construction as follows:
"Another well-settled rule is that covenant::;
and agreements restricting the free use of property are strictly construed against limitations
upon such use. Such restrictions will not be aided
or extended by implication or enlarged by construction. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the
unrestricted use of property." Id., 262 P. 2d at
830.
Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901 (Fla., 1925) involwd
a case in which the appellant erected a vocal studio on
a parcel of land with a covenant stating that the land
should be used only for residential purposes. The Supreme Court of Florida in upholding the covenant stated:

"Covenants restraining the free use of real
property, although not favored, will neverthelP~s
be enforced by courts of equity where the intention of the parties is clear in their creation, and
the restrictions and limitations are confined to a
lawful purpose and within reasonable bounds.
* * * Such covenants are strictly construed in
favor of the free and unrestricted use of real
property, but effect will be given to the manifest
intention of the parties as shown by the language
of the entire instrument in which the covenant
appears when considered in connection with the
circumstances surrounding the transaction * ~, '.
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\V or~s m;ed must be given their ordinary, obvious
111eanmg as commonly understood at the time the
instrument containing the covenants was executed
·~ .:, * or unless it clearly appears from the context
that the parties intended to use them in a differ<mt sense." Id., 106 So. at 903. Wing v. Forest
Lawn Cemetery Assn., 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P. 2d
1099 (19~·0), is to the same effect.

\V rite rs in tht> field are in agreement with the cases
cited herrin. Tiffany states:
"The courts do not favor restrictions upon
the utilization of land, and that a particular mode
of utilization is excluded by agreement must clearly appear." Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. 2 (2d ed.
1920), sec. 394 at p. 1427.

11 hompson on Real Property states:
"Covenants restraining the use of real estate
an• strictly construed in favor of the free and
unrestricted use of such property, with due regard
for the purpose contemplated as well as the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Pursuing
the philosophy that lands should be free and unencumbered whenever possible, courts have developed a strong tendency to construe restrictive
eovenants very strictly." Thompson, Real Property, Vol. 7, sec. 3160 at p. 106-107.
Thompson further states:
"All doubts should generally be resolved in
favor of the free use of the property and against
restrictions.'' Thompson, op. cit., at p. 108.
Tlw Ftah Supreme Court appears to be in agreenwnt with the cases cited and has so declared in Parrish
'
r. Richards, S Utah 2d -119, 336 P. 2d J22 (1959). That
ease involved a restrictive covenant which provided that
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there shall be erected on the land in question no "structure" other than a garage and one single family dwelling
not to exceed one story in height. This Court held that
this restriction did not forbid the erection of a tennis
0ourt surrounded by a wire fence. rrhe Court stated:
"The trial court followed the correct doctrine
that in the construction of uncertain .or amuig1wits restrictious the courts will resolve all do11[Jts
in favor of the free and irnrestricted 'Use of the
vroverty, and that it 'will have recourse to ewry
aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascertain th~
intention of the parties'." Id. at 421.
(b) The ordinary and approved usage of the term
"motel" does not include "restaurant," even
though the restaurant may be i1sed in conjunction with a motel.
The question then arises as to what is the "ordinary"
or "approved usagt>'' of the term ''motel.'' There an'
several cases bearing upon this point.
The Court stated in the Parrish case, supra, that:
"The same methods used for construing statutes can lw
applied to restrictive covenants." Id., at 421. Thereforr,
use may be made of Section 68-3-11 of the Utah Code,
which stat(JS as follows:
''Rules of construction as to words and
phrases. - Words and phrases are to be construed
according to the context and the approved usage
of the language; but technical words and phrases,
and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by
statute, are to be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.''
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In the case of Schermer v. Freniar Corp., 114 A. 2d
j;'i/ (N ..J., 1955), the New Jersey court in construing the
!lleaning of the word "motel" stated:
''The word 'motel' generally denotes a small
hotel where lodgings are available for hire, with a
minimum of personal service being furnished by
the proprietor."
rrhe New York courts have been in line with the deci::;ion stated above, but discounting more than most of
the jurisdictions the idea that motels involve more than
.Jllt:it sleeping quarters. In Von Der Heide v. Zoning Board
uf Appeals, 123 N.Y. Supp. 2d 726, 204 Misc. 746 (1953),
the Court stated:
"But a motel is commonly understood to be
an establishment essentially different from an inn
or hotel in design, purpose, and use. From early
times, an inn or hotel was * * * 'a house where a
traveler is furnished, as a regular matter of business, with food and lodging while on his journey'.
* * * On the other hand, a motel, as one generally
understands the terms, and as typified by the
building sought to be erected by the petitioner,
merely furnishes the transient guest with sleeping
quarters and bath and toilet facilities, with linen
service and a place to park his car." Id., at 730.
1'he Von Der JI eide case, supra, seems to clearly
indieate that, using the rule of ordinary meaning, the
\rnrd "motel" means no more than a place to sleep and
park one's automobile.
A Pennsylvania appellate court seems to clearly
~cparate motel facilities from restaurant facilities. In
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In Re Longo'.., Appeal, 13:2 A. 2d 899 (Pa., 1957), the
Court stated:
"Hophistry and :::;emantics to the contrary notwithstanding, the words 'motel' and 'hotel' lmve
different connotations. A motel niay be operated
U'ith ·or without restaurant facilit·ies. Certainl-y a
motel without a restaurant is not a hotel." Id .,
132 A. 2d at 901. (Emphasis sup]Jlied).
In ilf etropolitau Jui·cstrnc11t Co. v. Sine, 1-t Utah :JG,
376 P. 2d 9±0 (19G:2), the Utah Supreme Court uplwld
t]w coyenant re:::;tricting the erection of a motel itself, in
an action brought against the Appellants in this ea:::;e.
On the basis of the JJlctropolitan case, s·upra, the
Court limited itself strictly to the question of the erection of a ''motel,'' and therefore there has been no circmnventi on of the ease by the building of a restaurant on the
premises in question. rrhe Court has us<:>d language supporting this proposition, i.e.:
"To prevent an imposing motel on N ortlt
Tt>mple Street as far as possible was the main
rPason drf endants purchased the property from
FPndrelakis in the first place, and they carried
out this purpose in requiring the restriction a~
a condition of sale to Mr. Neilson***." Id., at 42.
The Court also used the term without any reference to
a restaurant or any motel complex:

"If a large nwtel was erected, in part, on the
:'mhject property * * "'." Id., at 42.
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POINT II.
Tll E APPELLANr:11 IS PRECLUDED FROM
THg gQUITABLE RELIEF HE SEEKS BY
rn~ASON OF LACHES.
rrho Court in its Findings of Fact found that in
}[areh, 19G5, the Appellants knew of the commencement
of th<> construction of a restaurant on the premises in
question hut that no action was taken to prevent further
eonstruction until on or about the 15th day of July, 1965,
when the Respondents had expended approximately
$:.W0,000.00 on the building and equipment. This finding
was amply supported by the evidence.

The Court, however, in its Memorandum Decision
(H. 57) did not base its determination on laches. The
point is argued here because it was incorporated in Responch,nts' motion to dismiss. The general rule of law
is that:
''A complainant seeking equitable relief against
the violation of a building restriction must act
promptly on discovery of the ground for complaint, as otherwise his laches may bar his right
to relief." 26 C.J.S. Deeds, Sec. 172, p. 1182.
Several cases are cited in support of the above text
but none of them are Utah decisions. A complete search
of the Digest System has disclosed no Utah case on the
point in question. An annotation at 12 A.L.R. 2d, p. 396,
entitled "Building Covenant...,Laches or Delay" collects
man~T cases on the subject. The following two cases are
illustrative of the foregoing rule and are pertinent here.
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Coates, et al. v. Young Women's Christian Ass 11 .
Philadelphia, 91 Atl. 863 (Pa., 1914), involved an action
to restrain the erection of a building in violation of a
building restriction prohibiting the erection of house~
fronting on a certain street. It appeared that a contract
for a building fronting on the street, and to cost $19,281.00, was let September 18, 1913, and its construction
began shortly thereafter. All passing by could see that
it fronted on the prohibited street, and that the work wat'
steadily progressing. The plaintiffs learned in Septernb<'r
and early in October that the work was going on but
made no objection until November 8, and gave no noticP
until November 11, when the building was nearly completed and substantially all the subcontracts had been
let. The court on appeal found that the lower court had
properly held that the plaintiffs' right of action \nl~
barred by laches.
Mercer, et ux. v. Keynton, et ux., 127 So. 859 (Fla.,
1930), involved a situation where restrictive covenants
as to the construction of buildings upon real estate did
not appear in the immediate deed of conveyance, but
were contained in the Muniments of Title of Record so
as to bind a purchaser. An injunction to restrain a violation of the restrictive covenants was denied without prrjudice. It was held upon appeal that the denial would
be affirmed whe,.e there was delay in seeking injunction
pending which the construction of the building progressed
so far as to make it inequitable to grant an injunction.
The plaintiffs had knowledge of the construction of the
building on or about March 22, 1928, but made no complaint until the filing of an action on April 30, 1928,
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when the framework of the entire building had been

<·0111pleted.

CONCLUSION
:F'or the foregoing reasons the Judgment of the
Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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